Abstract-To improve the accuracy of learning result, in practice multiple parties may collaborate through conducting joint BackPropagation neural network learning on the union of their respective data sets. During this process no party wants to disclose her/ his private data to others. Existing schemes supporting this kind of collaborative learning are either limited in the way of data partition or just consider two parties. There lacks a solution that allows two or more parties, each with an arbitrarily partitioned data set, to collaboratively conduct the learning. This paper solves this open problem by utilizing the power of cloud computing. In our proposed scheme, each party encrypts his/her private data locally and uploads the ciphertexts into the cloud. The cloud then executes most of the operations pertaining to the learning algorithms over ciphertexts without knowing the original private data. By securely offloading the expensive operations to the cloud, we keep the computation and communication costs on each party minimal and independent to the number of participants. To support flexible operations over ciphertexts, we adopt and tailor the BGN "doubly homomorphic" encryption algorithm for the multiparty setting. Numerical analysis and experiments on commodity cloud show that our scheme is secure, efficient, and accurate.
INTRODUCTION
B ACK-PROPAGATION [18] is an effective method for learning neural networks and has been widely used in various applications. The accuracy of the learning result, despite other facts, is highly affected by the volume of high-quality data used for learning. As compared to learning with only local data set, collaborative learning improves the learning accuracy by incorporating more data sets into the learning process [21] , [11] , [20] : the participating parties carry out learning not only on their own data sets, but also on others' data sets. With the recent remarkable growth of new computing infrastructures such as cloud computing, it has been more convenient than ever for users across the Internet, who may not even know each other, to conduct joint/collaborative learning through the shared infrastructure [13] , [14] .
Despite the potential benefits, one crucial issue pertaining to the Internet-wide collaborative neural network learning is the protection of data privacy for each participant. In particular, the participants from different trust domains may not want to disclose their private data sets, which may contain privacy or proprietary information, to anybody else. In applications such as healthcare, disclosure of sensitive data, for example, protected health information (PHI) [2] , is not only a privacy issue but of legal concerns according to the privacy rules such as Health Insurance Probability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1] . To embrace the Internet-wide collaborative learning, it is imperative to provide a solution that allows the participants, who lack mutual trust, to conduct neural network learning jointly without disclosing their respective private data sets. Preferably, the solution shall be efficient and scalable enough to support an arbitrary number of participants, each possessing arbitrarily partitioned data sets.
Challenges. Theoretically, secure multiparty computation (SMC) [22] can be used to solve problems of this kind. But the extremely high computation and communication complexity of SMC, due to the circuit size, usually makes it far from practical even in the two-party case. To provide practical solutions for privacy preserving Back-Propagation neural (BPN) network learning, three main challenges need to be met simultaneously: 1) To protect each participant's private data set and intermediate results generated during the BPN network learning process, it requires secure computation of various operations, for example, addition, scalar product, and the nonlinear sigmoid function, which are needed by the BPN network algorithm; 2) to ensure the practicality of the proposed solution, the computation/ communication cost introduced to each participant shall be affordable. To accommodate a large range of collaborative learning, the proposed solution shall consider system scalability. In particular, it shall be able to support an arbitrary number of participants without introducing tremendous computation/communication costs to each participant; 3) for collaborative training, the training data sets may be owned by different parties and partitioned in arbitrary ways rather than a single way of partition.
Related Work. Several privacy preserving BPN network learning schemes have been proposed recently. Schlitter [19] introduces a privacy preserving BPN network learning scheme that enables two or more parties to jointly perform BPN network learning without disclosing their respective private data sets. But the solution is proposed only for horizontal partitioned data. Moreover, this scheme cannot protect the intermediate results, which may also contain sensitive data, during the learning process. Chen and Zhong [6] propose a privacy preserving BPN network learning algorithm for two-party scenarios. This scheme provides strong protection for data sets including intermediate results. However, it just supports vertically partitioned data. To overcome this limitation, Bansal et. al. [4] enhanced this scheme and proposed a solution for arbitrarily partitioned data. Nevertheless, this enhanced scheme, just like [6] , was proposed for the two-party scenario. Directly extending them to the multiparty setting will introduce a computation/communication complexity quadratic in the number of participants. In practical implementation, such a complexity represents a tremendous cost on each party considering the already expensive operations on the underlying groups such as elliptic curves. However, [4] just considers the two-party scenario though it supports arbitrarily partitioned data set. To our best knowledge, none of existing schemes have solved all these challenges at the same time. There still lacks an efficient and scalable solution that supports collaborative BPN network learning with privacy preservation in the multiparty setting and allows arbitrarily partitioned data sets.
Our Contribution. In this work, we address this open problem by incorporating the computing power of the cloud. The main idea of our scheme can be summarized as follows: each participant first encrypts her/his private data with the system public key and then uploads the ciphertexts to the cloud; cloud servers then execute most of the operations pertaining to the learning process over the ciphertexts and return the encrypted results to the participants; the participants jointly decrypt the results with which they update their respective weights for the BPN network. During this process, cloud servers learn no privacy data of a participant even if they collude with all the rest participants. Through offloading the computation tasks to the resource-abundant cloud, our scheme makes the computation and communication complexity on each participant independent to the number of participants and is, thus, highly scalable. For privacy preservation, we decompose most of the subalgorithms of BPN network into simple operations such as addition, multiplication, and scalar product. To support these operations over ciphertexts, we adopt the Boneh, Goh, and Nissim (BGN) [5] "doubly homomorphic" encryption algorithm and tailor it to split the decryption capability among multiple participants for collusion-resistance decryption. As decryption of [5] is limited to small numbers, we introduce a novel design in our scheme such that arbitrarily large numbers can be efficiently decrypted. To protect the intermediate data during the learning process, we introduce a novel random sharing algorithm to randomly split the data without decrypting the actual value. Thorough security analysis shows that our proposed scheme is secure. Experiments conducted on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [15] , over real data sets from UCI machine learning repository [12] , show that our scheme significantly outperforms existing ones in computation/communication cost and accuracy loss.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first that provides privacy preservation for multiparty (more than two parties) collaborative BPN network learning over arbitrarily partitioned data. . Thorough analysis investigating privacy and efficiency guarantees of the proposed scheme is presented; real experiments on Amazon cloud further show our scheme's several magnitudes lower computation/communicational costs than the existing ones. . We tailor [5] to support multiparty secure scalar product and introduce designs that allow decryption of arbitrary large messages. These improvements can be used as independent general solutions for other related applications. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the models and assumptions. In Section 3, we introduce technique preliminaries, which are followed by detailed description of our proposed scheme in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates our proposed scheme. We conclude our work in Section 6.
MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS

System Model
We consider a system composed of three major parties: a trusted authority (TA), the participating parties (data owner), and the cloud servers (or cloud). TA is the party only responsible for generating and issuing encryption/decryption keys for all the other parties. It will not participate in any computation other than key generation and issuing. Each participating party s, denoted as P s , owns a private data set and wants to perform collaborative BPN network learning with all other participating parties. That is, they will collaboratively conduct learning over the arbitrarily partitioned data set, which is private and cannot be disclosed during the whole learning process. We assume that each participating party stays online with broadband access to the cloud and is equipped with one or several contemporary computers, which can work in parallel if there are more than one.
Security Model
Our scheme assumes the existence of a trusted authority, who is trusted by all the parties, TA has the knowledge of system secret key and will not participate in any computation besides the key generation and issuing. TA is allowed to learn about each party's private data whenever necessary. We claim that the existence of TA is useful when investigation is needed in case some malicious party intentionally interrupts the system, say using bogus data sets. In real life, parties such as the government agents or organization alliances can be the TA. Although the existence of TA is helpful, we leave the completely distributed solution as a future work.
The participating parties do not fully trust each other. Therefore, they do not want to disclose their respective private data (except for the final weights learned by the network) to any other parties than TA. The cloud is not fully trusted by the participating parties either, i.e., the cloud is not allowed to learn about the sensitive information, such as original data sets and intermediate data. In this paper, we follow the curious-but-honest model [8] . That is, all the parties (i.e., all the participating parties and the cloud) will honestly follow our protocol but try to discover others' private data as much as possible. A number malicious of participating parties may collude among themselves and/ or with the cloud.
TECHNIQUE PRELIMINARIES
Arbitrarily Partitioned Data
In this paper, we consider arbitrarily partitioned data [4] among multiparties, say Z parties (Z > 2). For arbitrarily partitioned data, each party P s ; 1 s Z, holds parts of the data set without any specific order. Specifically, consider a data set D with N 
Back-Propagation Neural Network Learning
Back-Propagation neural network learning algorithm is mainly composed of two stages: feed forward and error back-propagation. Fig. 1 shows is a configuration for a three layer (a-b-c) BP network. We use vector fx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x a g to denote the values of input nodes, vector fh 1 ; h 2 ; . . . ; h b g, and vector fo 1 ; o 2 ; . . . ; o c g to denote the values of hidden layer nodes and output layer nodes, respectively. w h jk is used to represent the weight connecting the input layer node k and the hidden layer node j. w o ij denotes the weight connecting j and the output layer node i, where 1 k a; 1 j b; 1 i c. During the BPN network learning process, the goal is to model a given function by modifying internal weights of input to generate an expected output. As described in Algorithm 1, all the weights are initialized as small random numbers [10] , [7] , [16] . In the Feed Forward Stage, values at each layer are calculated using the weights, the sigmoid function, and the values at the previous layer. In the Back À Propagation stage, the algorithm checks whether the error between output values and target values is within the threshold. If not, all the weights will be modified according to (1) , (2) and the learning procedure is repeated. The learning will not be terminated until the error is within the threshold or the max number of iterations is exceeded. After the learning, the final weights on each link are used to generate the learned network. Rumelhart et al. [18] describe details of the BPN network learning algorithm
BGN Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption enables operations on plaintexts to be performed on their respective ciphertexts without disclosing the plaintexts. Most existing homomorphic encryption schemes only support single operation-either addition or multiplication. Boneh et al. [5] introduced a public-key "doubly homomorphic" encryption scheme (called "BGN" for short), which simultaneously supports one multiplication and unlimited number of addition operations. Therefore, given ciphertexts Cðm 1 Þ; Cðm 2 Þ; . . . ; Cðm i Þ and Cðm 1 Þ; Cðm 2 Þ; . . . ; Cðm i Þ, one can compute
where CðÞ is the ciphertext of message m i orm i , encrypted by the system's public key. We refer to [5] for details of the BGN scheme.
We shall point out that the BGN scheme is designed for two parties. Moreover, due to message decryption involves solving discrete logarithm of the ciphertext using Pollard's lambda method, the BGN scheme just works with small numbers. While it is easy to make BGN decrypt long messages (in which the message is treated as a bit string) using a mode of operation, it is nontrivial to let BGN efficiently decrypt large numbers (wherein the final message is interpreted by its value and unknown to the encryptor after homomorphic operations).
OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
Problem Statement and Scheme Overview
Problem Statement. In this paper, we aim at enabling multiple parties to jointly conduct BPN network learning without revealing their private data. The input data sets owned by the parties can be arbitrarily partitioned. The computational and communicational costs on each party shall be practically efficient and the system shall be scalable.
Specifically, we consider a 3-layer (a-b-c configuration) neural network for simplicity but it can be easily extended to multilayer neural networks. The learning data set for the neural network, which has N samples (denoted as vector fx , weights, value of hidden layer node, value of output layer node) generated can be revealed to anybody other than TA.
Scheme Overview. To achieve the above goals, the main idea of our proposed scheme is to implement a privacy preserving equivalence for each step of the original BPN network learning algorithm described in Algorithm 1. Different from the original BPN network learning algorithm, our proposed scheme lets each party encrypt her/ his input data set and upload the encrypted data to the cloud, allowing the cloud servers to perform most of the operations, i.e., additions and scalar products. To support these operations over ciphertexts, we adopt and tailor the BGN "doubly homomorphic" encryption [5] for data encryption. Nevertheless, as the BGN algorithm just supports one step multiplication over ciphertext, the intermediate results, for example, the intermediate products or scalar products, shall be first securely decrypted and then encrypted to support consecutive multiplication operations as described in Algorithm 1. For privacy preservation, however, the decrypted results known to each party cannot be the actual intermediate values, for example, the values of the hidden layer. For this purpose, we design a secret sharing algorithm that allows the parties to decrypt only the random shares of the intermediate values. The random shares allow the parties to collaboratively execute the following steps without knowing the actual intermediate values. Data privacy is thus well protected. The overall algorithm is described in Algorithm 2, which is the privacy preserving equivalence of Algorithm 1. To support the operations defined in Algorithm 2, we propose three other cloud-based algorithms: Algorithm 3 for secure scalar product and addition, Algorithm 4 for secure random sharing, and Algorithm 5 for sigmoid function approximation. After the entire process of the privacy preserving learning, all the parties jointly establish a neural network representing the whole data set without disclosing any private data to each other. . Key Generation: T A generates two cyclic groups G and G 1 of order n ¼ q 1 q 2 , where q 1 and q 2 are large primes, and a bilinear map e : G Â G ! G 1 . Then it picks two random generators g; u 2 G and computes
Þmod n, where q 1s is randomly chosen from Z n for 1 s Z. For 1 s Z, TA sends q 1s to party P s as her/his secret key. The public key is published as P K ¼ ðn; G; G 1 ; e; g; hÞ, and the system master key is SK ¼ q 1 which is only known to T A. . Encryption: Given a message M, encrypt it as:
. Secure Scalar Product: Given the ciphertexts of vector (M 11 ; M 12 ; . . . ; M 1v ) and (M 21 ; M 22 ; . . . ; M 2v ), the cloud computes their scalar product as: Since
, we have:
Mi
Note that h q1 ¼ 1. P v i¼1 M i can be efficiently solved using Pollard's lambda method [17] given g q1 . The encrypted scalar product can be decrypted jointly in the similar way.
Privacy Preserving Multiparty Neural Network Learning
In this section, we introduce our cloud-based privacy preserving multiparty BPN network learning algorithm over arbitrarily partitioned data. As we described in Algorithm 2, all the parties generate and assign random weights w h jks and w o ijs to each P s and make agreement on the max number of learning iteration iteration max , the learning rate , error threshold and target value t i of each output layer node at the beginning of learning. In the Feed Forward Stage, all the parties agree on the terms of approximation for the sigmoid function according to their accuracy requirement (details given in Section 4.5) and obtain random shares h js for value of hidden layer node and o is for value of output layer node. After the Feed Forward Stage, all the parties work together to check whether the network has reached the error threshold. If not, they proceed to the Back-Propagation Stage, which aims at modifying the weights so as to achieve correct weights in the neural network. 
Secure Scalar Product and Addition with Cloud
In this section, we tailor [5] and propose an algorithm that allows multiple parties to perform secure scalar product and homomorphic addition operations on ciphertexts using cloud computing. Specifically, each party encrypts her/his data with the system public key and uploads the ciphertexts to the cloud. The cloud servers compute the sum of original messages based on their ciphertexts. If the original messages are vectors, the cloud computes the scalar product of the vectors. During this process, the cloud does not need to decrypt nor learn about the original messages. The final result of the sum or scalar product is returned to all the parties in ciphertext. Decrypting the results needs the participation of all the parties using Pollard's lambda method. Due to efficiency limitation of the Pollard's lambda method, the algorithm in [5] can only work well with relative small numbers. We overcome such a limitation and make it suitable for large numbers. Our algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.
Decryption of Large Numbers. Message decryption in the BGN algorithm involves solving the discrete log using Pollard's lambda method [17] . On a single contemporary computer, for example, the Pollard's lambda method is able to decrypt numbers of up to 30-40 bits within a reasonable time slot (e.g., in minutes or hours). Decryption of larger numbers is usually believed less practical in terms of the time complexity. In practice, however, it is hard to guarantee that the final results (numbers) are always small enough for the Pollard's lambda method to efficiently decrypt. This is either because the numbers contained in the vectors are too large, or the vectors are too long (of high dimension). To overcome this limitation, we propose to let the data holders divide the numbers, if they are large, into several numbers, and the cloud then decrypt the smaller "chunks" with which the final result can be recovered. The decryption process can be parallelized for efficiency. Assuming that the cloud is able to efficiently decrypt the result if each input number is less than d bits, our solution for supporting large numbers can be described as follows: Without loss of generality, we just consider the scalar product operation over input numbers of 3d bits.
Let V A ¼ (A 1 ; A 2 ; . . . ; A k ) and V B ¼ (B 1 ; B 2 ; . . . ; B k ) be two vectors, where A i and B i are 3d-bit numbers for 1 i k. Each number can be represented as
We can compute the product of A i Ã B i as follows:
Therefore, instead of directly calculating P k i¼1 ðA i Ã B i Þ, the participants can first compute P k i¼1 ðA i0 Ã B i0 Þ; . . . ; P k i¼1 ðA i2 Ã B i2 Þ separately and finally recover P k i¼1 ðA i Ã B i Þ. For this purpose, the data holders need to split A i and B i and encrypt A i0 ; A i1 ; A i2 and B i0 ; B i1 ; B i2 , which are d-bit numbers. By doing this, the encryption cost on each data holder increases by x times, where x is the number of smaller numbers that each large number is broken into. In the above example, x ¼ 3. The cloud needs to perform x 2 more time operations on ciphertexts than for a single scalar product. x 2 more decryptions will be performed by participants and the cloud. If x is fixed, the expansion of computation/communication cost is of constant time.
Usually, x will not be large. For example, if 30-bit numbers can be efficiently decrypted, our technique can efficiently decrypt 90-bit numbers with x ¼ 3.
Secure Sharing of Scalar Product and Sum
For privacy protection, the actual intermediate results shall also be protected and cannot be known to each party or the cloud server. While collaboratively running the BPN network learning algorithm, the parties need to execute consecutive operations such as addition and multiplication. However, the "BGN" algorithm [5] only supports one step multiplication over ciphertext. To support consecutive multiplications, the parties need to decrypt the intermediate results first. However, straightforward decryption of the intermediate values will reveal these values to the parties, which may have privacy implications and shall be avoided [6] . To protect these intermediate results (scalar products or sum), we introduce a secure sharing algorithm in Algorithm 4, which enables each participating party to get a random share of the intermediate result without knowing its actual value. As described in Algorithm 3, Z parties can efficiently perform secure scalar product and addition computation with the help of cloud. 
wherer s R Z p . All the parties work together to decrypt the difference between and sumL asL ¼ À sumL j jand send it to P 1 . Note that 0 < P Z s¼1 L s < Z Ã u; 0 < < u, we have Àu < P Z s¼1 L s À < Z Ã u. As the cloud is able to efficiently decrypt numbers as large as u, it can decrypt P Z s¼1 L s À efficiently as long as Z (i.e., the number of parties) is not very large. Finally, each P s get its secure share s of , where
As mentioned before, the sign ofL cannot be decided before decryption. If À sumL is negative, the direct decryption ofL using Pollard's lambda method will be extremely slow. This is because the negative value on group will result in decryption of n ÀL which is a very large number given that the order n of group is large, and cannot be efficiently handled by Pollard's lambda method. To ensure efficient computation ofL, we consider the following two possible cases: Case1: > P Z s¼1 L s ; and Case2: < P Z s¼1 L s ). In multiparty scenarios (Z ! 2), as L s R ð0; uÞ, there is a high possibility that < P Z s¼1 L s . Therefore, the cloud and all the parties can start decryption from Case2 as shown in Algorithm 4. If the successful decryption ofL cannot be achieved (i.e., the decryption algorithm does not return) in an empirical time using the Pollard's lambda method, we can change to decryptL using method of Case1.
Approximation of Activation Function
In this section, we introduce the approximation of activation function using Maclaurin series expansion [3] and its secure sharing based on Algorithms 3 and 4. Since the "BGN" encryption does not support exponentiation operations over ciphertext (i.e., calculating Cðe x Þ given CðxÞ) and cannot directly support the secure computation of sigmoid function 1 1þe Àx . We utilize Maclaurin series expansion to approximate the sigmoid function and make it suitable for our proposed Algorithms 3 and 4. For the sigmoid function 1 1þe Àx 2 ð0; 1Þ, we can guarantee the converge of its Maclaurin series and approximate it as
Due to the property of Maclaurin series, the terms in the expansion can be decided depend on the accuracy requirement. As shown in the approximation of sigmoid function in (6), the major challenge of secure computation for the equation becomes how to compute x k ; 2 k n and share it without disclosing any privacy data. Using Algorithms 3 and 4, Z parties are able to securely calculate and share x. Based on these properties, we propose Algorithm 5 to securely share x k . Taking x 2 for instance, Z parties first work together to get the secure shares of x using Algorithms 3 and 4, denoted as x s for party P s . With the ciphertext of x and x s , P s then calculatesĈ s ðxÞ ¼ Cðxx s Þ ¼ CðxÞ xs and uploads it to the cloud. Cloud computes Cðx 2 Þ using secure addition in Algorithm 3 and finally all the parties securely get the shares of x 2 with Algorithm 4. The scenarios of x k ; k > 2 can be easily extended as x 2 . The correctness of this algorithm is proved in Appendix 1.2, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TPDS.2013.18.
Security Analysis
Lemma 4.1. Algorithm 3 is semantically secure assuming the group G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption. Due to the space limitation, the detail security analysis is provided in Appendix 1.1, available in the online supplemental material.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To measure the impact of our improvements from existing schemes and evaluate the practicality of our privacypreserving BPN network learning scheme, we numerically analyze it and fully implemented it on Amazon EC2 cloud.
Numerically Analysis
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme in terms of computation cost and communication cost and compare it with the existing techniques. For expression simplicity, in the following part of this section, we denote time cost of one multiplication operation on Group G as MUL 1 and that of one exponentiations operation on Group G as EXP.
For the neural network configuration (a-b-c) (cf. Section 3.2), first each party P s needs to encrypt all its privacy data once using Algorithm 3 with 2ðn s þ b þ cÞ EXP and ðn s þ b þ cÞ MUL, where n s is the number of data attributes held by P s , a, b, and c represent the number of input layer nodes, hidden layer nodes, and output layer nodes, respectively. Note that this is the one-time cost performed before the learning process starts. In the Feed Forward Stage, by using Algorithms 4 and 5, each party performs 11ðb þ cÞ EXP and 3ðb þ cÞ MUL to get the random shares of every hidden layer node value and output layer node value. In the BackPropagation Stage, to get the random share of changes for each output layer nodes, each P s performs 5c EXP þ 2c MUL and 5b EXP þ 2b MUL, respectively, for step1; 3; step2; 4 both need 3b EXP and b MUL and step5 needs 7b EXP and 3b MUL. Thus, P s needs to perform ð18b þ 5cÞ EXP þ ð4b þ 2cÞ MUL using Algorithms 3 and 4. Our scheme is composed of four subalgorithms. We give the detail analysis of each subalgorithm in Appendix 1.3, available in the online supplemental material, due to space limitation.
Combining the cost for the two stages, the computation cost for each party P s for one round privacy preserving BPN network learning in multiparty scenarios is 31b þ 18c þ 2n s EXP and 8b þ 6c þ n s MUL. For cloud side, it needs to perform 4 þ a þ b þ c pairing operations on group G, Z Ã ð8b þ 14cÞ MUL and 11 decryption, where the complexity of each decryption is Oð ffiffiffiffi ffi K p Þ and K is the size of message for decryption. Although the computation cost on cloud side will linearly increase with the party number, cloud can handle it in parallel efficiently. For communication cost, each party P s needs to exchange n s Ã a þ 24b þ 5c messages with ðn s Ã a Ã jGj þ ð24b þ 5cÞ Ã jG 1 jÞ bits during the one round privacy preserving BPN network learning process. By securely outsourcing most computation tasks to the cloud server, our scheme makes the cost of each party independent to the number of participating parties. To compare our scheme with existing ones [4] , [6] , we summarize the cost of our scheme and [4] , [6] in Table 1 . Considering the same neural network configuration (a-b-c), when extending scheme in [4] to Z parties scenarios, which utilized ElGamal [9] for secure computation,
are needed for each party P s for computation. When compared to the scheme in [6] , which can support two-party privacy preserving BPN network learning over vertical partitioned data, Z parties scenario will introduce Z 2 Ã ð5ab þ 2bc þ abc þ 4n s ð2bc þ 4ab þ bÞÞ(EXP þ MUL) computation cost to the each party. For communication cost, schemes in [4] , [6] will cause Z 2 Ã ðab þ 3bc þ 4b þ 2Þ Ã jG 1 j þ 2n s Ã jG 1 j bits and Z 2 Ã ðb þ 2bc þ 4ab þ 2Þ Ã jG 1 j þ 2n s Ã jG 1 j bits, respectively, for Z parties scenarios. Different form our scheme, both [4] and [6] will introduce computation/communication cost quadratic in Z, where Z is the number of participating parties. As a result, by offloading most computation cost to the cloud, our proposed scheme significantly outperforms the existing works in multiparty scenarios without any limitation on the type of data partition.
1. When the operation is on the elliptic curve, EXP means scalar multiplication operation and MUL means one point addition operation. 
Experimental Evaluation
Experiment Setup
To evaluate the practical performance of our cloud-based privacy-preserving BPN network learning scheme, we fully implemented it using C language under Linux environment. The experiments were executed on Amazon EC2 cloud, including 10 nodes with 8-core 2.93-GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 8-GB memory. The testing data sets (Iris, kr-vs-kp, diabetes) are from UCI machine learning repository [12] . We randomly distribute the data sets to each participate, (i.e., arbitrarily partitioned). The learning parameters and architecture used for our neural network model are shown in Table 2 . The number of hidden nodes are chosen based on the number of input and output nodes, which follows the same criteria utilized in [6] . Feature values in each data set are normalized between ½0; 1. The number of participants in our experiments varies from 2 to 8.
Experimental Result
In this section, we provide the experimental results of our scheme in terms of computational and communicational costs. At the same time, we compare it with the existing privacy-preserving BPN network scheme [6] .
Dataset P reparation. Before outsourcing his/her private data to cloud for BPN network learning, every party P s needs to encrypt the data with Algorithm 3. Fig. 2 shows that the data encryption time for each party is greatly affected by the number of samples and features in the data set, which varies from 4.12 to 120.21 s for different data sets. However, this is a one-time cost and can be precomputed offline.
Collaborative Learning. For multiparty privacy-preserving BPN network learning with fixed neural network architecture, there are two factors-the number of party and the size of data set-that mainly affect the system performance according to the experimental results of existing schemes [6] . As the number of participants increases the operations for each party to share intermediate results and decrypt that the final learning result remain the same in our proposed scheme.
As shown in Fig. 3a , when the number of parties varies from 2 to 8, the overall learning time stays stable in our scheme, which are about 10.68, 21.86, and 36.69 minutes for Iris, Diabetes, and kr-vs-kp, respectively. The learning time does not change with the number of parties because the cloud performs most learning operations in parallel without learning the private data. However, as demonstrated in Fig. 3b , [6] , when extended to the multiparty setting, introduces a quadratically increasing cost in the number of parties for each P s , which can be up to 961.52, 2,152.12, and 5,750.08 minutes for Iris, Diabetes, and kr-vs-kp, respectively, and makes the learning scheme less practical. Notably, even in the two-party setting, for which [6] was designed, our scheme can still save at least 37 percent learning time as shown in Fig. 4 .
To measure the influence of data set size, we use 1/4, 1/ 2, 3/4, and all the samples in the data set, respectively, for learning. As demonstrated in Fig. 5a , the increase of data set size has slightly influence on the performance of our scheme. The growth of data set size will not cause extra computation to the participants. This is because most operations needed by the learning algorithm have been offloaded to the cloud which can conduct parallel computation. The overall processing time can be kept stable by employing more cloud servers as the data set size increases. Nevertheless, in [6] the computational cost on each party increases linearly to the data set size as shown in Fig. 5b . This is because in [6] each party has to perform all the operations pertaining to the learning process by himself/ herself. Similarly, based on our previous numerical analysis, [4] has the comparable computation complexity as [6] , which increases quadratically with the number parties and changes linearly to the size of data set. Therefore, [4] cannot support privacy-preserving BPN network learning efficiently in the setting of multiparty (i.e., more than two parties) or in case of large data sets as our proposed scheme does.
Communication Cost. In our scheme, the only party that each participating party P s communicates with is the cloud server during the collaborative learning process. For data set preparation, each party P s needs to upload his/her encrypted data set to the cloud. As shown in Table 3 , in our scheme the bandwidths introduced to each party are 7.72, 79.09, and 1,481.27 KB for Iris, Diabetes, and kr-vs-kp, respectively. Although the cost grows linearly to the size of data set, it is a one-time cost and will not influence the realtime performance of the learning process. For collaborative learning, each party P s only exchanges data with cloud for decryption or securely sharing operations. As shown in Table 3 , the bandwidth consumption for each party P s during the learning process varies from 3.44 to 7.84 KB for different data sets. As the number of parties increases, the communication cost remains stable for each party during the learning process as shown in Fig. 6a . This is because the volume of data for each party to exchange stays constant as the total number of parties changes. Furthermore, Fig. 6b demonstrates that the growth of data set size has slight influence on each party's communication cost in our scheme during the collaborative learning process. As our previous complexity analysis indicates the communication complexity of both [6] and [4] grows quadratically to the number of parties and linearly to the data set size, which limits their practical usage in scenarios of multiple parties or large data sets ( [6] or [4] did not provide their communication costs in their experiments).
From our experimental results, we clearly note that: 1) our scheme can efficiently deal with privacy-preserving BPN network learning for multiparty scenarios, thanks to the high scalability of cloud; 2) our scheme can efficiently handle the relative large data set for learning, which is compared to the linearly increasing computation/communication cost of existing works; 3) our scheme can be implemented with easy communication protocol design since each party only needs to communicate with the cloud server.
Accuracy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the accuracy loss in our privacypreserving BPN network learning scheme and compare it with existing schemes [6] , [4] . Recall that in our proposed scheme (cf. Section 4) the only place that introduces accuracy loss is the approximation of the activation function. We utilize the Maclaurin series expansion to approximate the function, whose accuracy can be adjusted by modifying the number of series terms according to the system requirement. Similar method of approximation with Maclaurin series expansion is also used in [24] though it just supports the two-party setting. As shown in Table 4 , our scheme can achieve a similar accuracy performance as the existing schemes [6] , [4] when we set the number of Maclaurin series terms as 5. By extending the number of series terms to 9, we can reduce the accuracy loss by about 1 percent which outperforms the existing schemes [6] , [4] . This is because [6] , [4] introduce accuracy losses not only in the approximation of the activation function, but also during the mapping of real numbers in sigmod function to fixed-point representations in every step of Feed Forward Stage and BackPropagation Stage. Differently, our proposed scheme omits this limitation and thus can be efficiency performed on the sigmod function without any accuracy loss during the secure computation process. Compared to the non-privacypreserving BPN network learning algorithm, our scheme introduces about only 1.3-2 percent more error rate in nine series terms setting, as shown in Table 4 , which are acceptable in practical use and can be further improved by adding more series terms.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed the first secure and practical multiparty BPN network learning scheme over arbitrarily partitioned data. In our proposed approach, the parties encrypt their arbitrarily partitioned data and upload the ciphertexts to the cloud. The cloud can execute most operations pertaining to the BPN network learning algorithm without knowing any private information. The cost of each party in our scheme is independent to the number of parties. This work tailors the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm to support the multiparty scenario, which can be used as an independent solution for other related applications. Complexity and security analysis shows that our proposed scheme is scalable, efficient, and secure. One interesting future work is to enable multiparty collaborative learning without the help of TA.
